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IS THE LIFE TENANT OR REMAINDERMAN OF STOCK
ENTITLED TO EXTRAORDINARY CASH OR STOCK DIVI-
DENDS ?'
The question whether a life tenant or remainderman is entitled to
extraordinary cash or stock dividends is a matter of the'utmost im-
portance under modern business conditions. Large corporate holdings
are daily bequeathed by will and it is out of the creation of trust es-
tates by will that the situation under consideration arises necessitating
the intervention of the Courts.
All jurisdictions are agreed that the conflicting claims of life
tenant and remainderman to an extraordinary dividend rest on the
intention of the testator as indicated in the trust instrument. But it is
in the absence of definite language disposing of extraordinary divi-
dends that the matter is presented for judicial determination. 'Phrase-
ology which directs the payment to a specified person during his life
of "income," "dividends," "interest, dividends and income," and words
of similar import bring before the Courts the query whether the trustee
112 L. R. A. N. S-768 and note; 35 L. R. A. N. S. S-563 and note; 50 L. R.
A. N S-510 and note; L. R& A. 1916, D-210, and note.
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shall credit an extraordinary dividend to the life tenant or remainder-
man. No such question occurs in connection with ordinary dividends
which are deemed to have been earned as of the date of their declara-
tion, and become property of the holder of the stock at that time.
An ordinary dividend, it may be noted, is distinguished from one
of an extraordinary nature in that the former "is periodically declared
and distributed among the shareholders of the corporation while the
latter is declared and distributed at irregular intervals out of accumu-
lated profits. The length of time during which the directors have
allowed profits to accumulate, however, before declaring the dividend
affords no satisfactory test as to its nature, as ordinary dividends are
sometimes declared out of accumulated profits, and extraordinary ones
out of profits recently earned."'2
The conflict in the authorities relative to the disposition of extra-
ordinary dividends is confined to earnings past or current-a dividend
which reduces corporate capital, or which arises from an advance in
its value due to reasons other than an accumulation of profits, belongs
indisputably to the corpus of the estate.
The first rule formulated on the matter of the ownership of extra-
ordinary dividends was the early English rule,3 now obsolete, which
gave all extraordinary cash or stock dividends to the remainderman as
a part of the corpus of the trust fund.
The inconvenience of investigating the corporation's books and
the practical ease with which this rule was applied, seems to have
been the cause for its adoption. A cynical commentator, however,
attributes its confirmation4 to the influence brought to bear by the
Bank of England, when, to the consternation of its directors, the Court
intimated its intention of going over the bank's records in order to
apportion the dividend between the rival claimants.5 This view of the
law, obviously unfair to the life tenant, has been superseded by the
later English rule, which is identical with the Massachusetts Supreme
Court rule, in holding all stock dividends to be corpus and all cash
dividends, income.6
The three rules now in force are the Kentucky rule (formerly the
New York and Kentucky rule); the Massachusetts-United States
2 9 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, 710.
3 Brandes v. Brandes, 4 Ves. Jr. 800.
4 Irving v. Houston, 4 Paton, Sc. App. Cas. 521.
512 L. R. A. N. S. 775.
6 Bouch v. Sproule L. R. 12, App. Cas. 397.
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Supreme Court rule (sometimes known as the Massachusetts and later
English rule) ; and the Pennsylvania rule.
The Kentucky rule, briefly stated, is this: extraordinary cash
dividends, or stock, declared during a life-tenancy out of profits be-
come the property of the life tenant whether such dividends were
earned before or after the beginning of his estate.7
It will be observed that while the early English rule gave all extra-
ordinary dividends to the remainderman, the Kentucky Court swings
to the other extreme and holds that such dividends belong to the life
tenant as income. This precept rejects as a criterion of distribution
either the nature of the dividend, i. e., whether stock or cash, or an
apportionment based upon the time when the profits accumulated with
reference to the vesting of the life estate.
The leading Kentucky case, s in refusing to apply either of the
above tests, says: "The difficulty attending such an inquiry, the im-
possibility of attaining accuracy, and of ascertaining the many sources
from which the profit has been derived, are the reasons for this rule;
but it does not also follow that the declaration of the company, as to
the character of the dividends, determines its legal status and to whom
it shall belong."
Kentucky agrees with Massachusetts as to the impracticability of
an apportionment, but, unlike Massachusetts, refuses to let the cor-
porate act in declaring stock or cash determine its owner.
Dicta favoring Kentucky9 are found in several cases, but we know
of no State following Kentucky when the dividends were out of profits,
which had clearly accumulated, partly before and partly during the life
estate.
New York formerly subscribed to the Kentucky doctrine, but in
the well-considered case of In re Osborne'0 alligned itself definitely
with the apportionment rule promulgated by the Courts of Pennsyl-
vania.
The Pennsylvania rule was first enunciated in the leading case
of Earp's Appeal." It is in substance this: The Court, as a criterion
Hite v Hite, 93 Ky. 257; Cox v. Gaulbert, 148 Ky. 407.
S Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257.
9 Bryan v. Aiken, 45 L. R. A. N. S-477; Kalbach v. Clark, 133 Iowa 215.
10 In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450.
1 Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368; Stokes' Estate, 240 Pa. 277; Re Heaton, L.
R A., 1916, D-201; Miller and Payne, 105 Wis. 354; In re Baldwin, 209 N. Y.
601; Smith's Estate, 140 Pa. 344; In re Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450; Thomas v.
Gregg, 78 Md, 545; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 74 N. H. 201; Ballantine v. Young,
79 N J. Eq. 70; Goodwin v. McGaughey, 108 Minn. 248.
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for determining the respective rights of life tenant or remainderman,
takes into consideration the time in which an extraordinary dividend,
either cash or stock, is earned with relation to the beginning of the life
estate. If profits have accumulated before the life tenancy com-
mences and a dividend is declared therefrom after its inception, the
dividend belongs to the corpus of the estate, since it was not earned
during the life estate. By a parity of reasoning all profits earned dur-
ing the life tenancy belong to the life tenant, and if the profits have
accumulated partly before and partly during the life tenancy, the
extraordinary dividends, either stock or cash, are divided between
remainderman and life tenant, respectively, in proportion to the amount
of profits accumulated before and after the life estate's inception.
It will be observed that the Pennsylvania rule rejects the char-
acter of the dividend as a basis upon which to determine the rights of
the parties and looks entirely to the time of the earning of the dividend
as a test.
The Massachusetts-Supreme Court rule is, succinctly stated, "to
regard cash dividends, however large as income, and stock dividends,
however made, as capital."' 2 This principle disregards entirely the
question of the time in which the profits making up the dividend have
accumulated; the form of the dividend as declared by the directors
of the corporation, acting in good faith, definitely decides its owner.
13
One of the outstanding cases in this line of decisions is Gibbons v.
Mahon,' 4 which reasons with vigor and clearness, thus: "Therefore,
when a distribution of earnings is made by a corporation among its
stockholders, the question whether such a distribution is an apportion-
ment of additional stock representing capital, or a division of profits
and income, depends upon the substance and intent of the action of
the corporation as manifested by its vote or resolution; and ordinarily
a dividend declared in stock is to be deemed capital, and a dividend in
money is to be deemed income, of each share.
"A stock dividend really takes nothing from the property of the
corporation and adds nothing to the interests of the shareholders. Its
property is not diminished, and their interests are not increased. After
such a dividend, as before, the corporation has the title in all the cor-
porate property; the aggregate interests therein of all the shareholders
12 Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 108.
23 Mansfield v. Mansfield, 79 Conn. 634; DeKoven v. Alsop, 205 Il1. 309; In
re Brown, 14 R. I. 371; Billings v. Warren, 216 IlL 281; Hyde v. Holmes, 198
Mass. 287; Spooner v. Phillips, 16 L. R. A. 461.
14 Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549.
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are represented by the whole number of shares; and the proportional
interest of each shareholder remains the same. The only change is in
the evidence which represents that interest, the new shares and the
original shares together representing the same proportional interest."
Later in the case is this language: "A dividend is something with
which the corporation parts, but it parted with nothing in issuing this
new stock. It simply gave new evidence of ownership which always
existed."
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Towne v.
Eisner15 has affirmed Gibbons v. Mahan and has quoted it with ap-
proval, re-enunciating the doctrine that a stock dividend belongs to the
corpus of an estate, and therefore is not taxable as income under the
Federal Income Tax.
The reasoning in favor of the Massachusetts rule found in Gib-
bons v. Mahan, supra, commends itself at first glance as logically
sound, but on close examination appears somewhat casuistic.
Though, as the Court truly says, after a declaration of a stock
dividend a shareholder's proportional interest remains the same in the
corporate funds, yet those funds, if the dividend is rightfully declared
out of profits, have increased to the amount of such dividend, and if
the shareholder sell his new shares, by such sale the original investment
evidenced by the old shares has not been depleted an iota. How, then,
can such additional shares be termed anything but income?
The Court says: "The question whether a distribution of earn-
ings among stockholders is an apportionment of additional stock or a
division of profits, and income defends on the substance and intent of
the action of the corporation." This, then, is the gist of the matter-
the corporation rather than the courts becomes the judge of the rights
of life tenant and remainderman through an arbitrary ruling that the
intention of the testator will thus be effectuated.
It is universally admitted that directors of a corporation, acting
for the best interests of the corporation, may declare cash dividends,
stock dividends, or no dividends at all, but it does not follow logically
that once the dividend is declared, the corporation rather than the law
should determine whether it be corpus or income in the dispute between
the parties themselves.
It is amusing to observe the conflict between the two theories in
the viewpoint of the judges. Take, for example, this language from a
':.Towne v. Eisner, 62 U. S. L. Ed. 183.
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decision which upholds the Pennsylvania doctrine,10 though, as is ap-
parent, with reluctance:
"As a matter of logic, it is difficult to resist the reasoning
leading to the conclusion that stock dividends are, in fact, prin-
cipal; for the life tenant, as is usually held, is not, in the absence
of fraud, or improper conduct, entitled to the earnings until they
are distributed. They are not, in fact, distributed, but on the
contrary, put permanently into capital account when new stock
is, without any money equivalent, allotted to the whole body of
stockholders."
In contrast we find this expression from a Court following the
Massachusetts rule and in reference to it: "It was not pretended that
this rule * * * was the ideal rule of reason; nor have the Courts
which have given their approval of it ever claimed it to be such, or one
which would accomplish exact justice under all circumstances, 1 7
The reason given over and over again for the application of the
Massachusetts rule is, that by its certainty and ease of application it is
more productive of justice in the long run than is a search behind a
dividend to discover the equitable demands of each case.
Were the Massachusetts rule always simple to apply and the Penn-
sylvania rule invariably complex, a sound argument for the former
would exist despite its purely arbitrary character, though even this is
denied indirectly by the opinion in Goodwin v. McGaughey in this
phrase: "It may be that it is not always easy to determine when the
fund was earned, but that fact alone is not sufficient for refusing to
apply the (Pennsylvania) rule.""'
But it is by no means so simple as it first appears. All Courts
following this (Massachusetts) rule hold:
I. That the discretion of the corporation in declaring the
dividend will not be binding if done in fraud or bad faith.' 0
II. That the Court will look into a dividend to ascertain
whether it is declared out of capital or profits.
III. That the Court will examine a so-called stock or cash
dividend to ascertain its true nature and distribute it ac-
cordingly, or in other words, "in deetrmining what is a cash
118Ballantine v. Young, 79 N. J. Eq. 70.
17 Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543.
Is Goodwin v. McGaughey, 108 Minn. 248.
29 Gibbons v. Mahan, supra.
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dividend and what is a stock dividend, substance and not form is
regarded and often it is difficult to decide to which class a par-
ticular dividend belongs." 2
If we stop to consider that the Courts will investigate a dividend's
good faith, its source in earnings or capital, and its subsequent nature,
there seems small ground for their criticism of the apportionment rule,
i. e., that the insuperable difficulty of investigating corporate accounts
renders such task uncertain and hence unfair. Since Massachusetts
Courts look into the matters hitherto enumerated, they could with equal
propriety inquire as to the time in which a dividend was earned.
Another matter to consider in this connection is one frequently
overlooked-only in cases involving a dispute as to the time of earning
does the apportionment rule become complex and unwieldy of applica-
tion. In any other case the corporations books alone furnish the requi-
site information.
The Pennsylvania rule does substantial justice to both parties.
Under it, a corporation, even for legitimate business reasons, cannot,
by the accumulation of profits before the vesting of the life estate, and
the declaration of a cash dividend thereafter, strip the remainderman
of all claim thereto. Neither can it turn over the entire income earned
during a life tenancy to the remainderman by deciding to keep the
profits for further corporate use and issuing for that purpose stock
instead of cash dividends.
The interests of both parties are guarded under the Pennsylvania
rule and are not dependent on the varying exigencies of business con-
ditions as evidenced by the issue of cash or stock. The principle is
occasionally as difficult and unsatisfactory in its application as its
opponents allege; but it is based on an equitable attempt at fairness
and is theoretically perfect, though, as we know, no rule of law ac-
complishes perfect justice in every case in which it is applied. Still,
the failure of such an equitable test in a few cases would not justify
the susbtitution therefore of an arbitrary rule for purposes of conven-
ience, the results of which may be, and frequently are, more unfair
than a faulty apportionment.
The Pennsylvania rule, in fact, to do perfect justice, should go
farther and apply the time-of-earning test to the termination of the life
tenancy and the beginning of the remainderman's estate. The present
rule, by the great weight of authority under all methods of determining
the rights of the parties at the close of the life tenancy, is to give to the
2 Lyman v. Pratt, 13 Mass. 58.
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remainderman, as though it were an ordinary dividend, any extraordi-
nary dividend declared after the vesting of his estate, regardless of
whether it was earned before such period or subsequent to it.
The concluding argument for the Pennsylvania rule is a matter
of human experience. It is a reasonable supposition when a testator,
in creating a trust, gives "income for life" without mentioning extraor-
dinary dividends, that he regards his entire corporate holdings at the
time of his death as principal. The most natural thought to one mak-
ing such a will would be that his death fixes the rights of the parties
and that "income" would consequently refer to profits made after his
death.
Foi these reasons the Pennsylvania rule (amended to extend the
apportionment test to the end as well as the beginning of the life
tenancy), seems better than the others now existing, both to effectuate
the intention of the testator and to form a standard for doing sub-
stantial justice in the adjudication of the conflicting claims of life
tenant and remainderman.21
SARAH ROSS BROWN COLE.*
=
1This question has not been adjudicated in Missouri, though a dictum in
the case of Knapp v. George Knapp & Company, 127 Mo. 53, favors Massa-
chusetts.
*This article was awarded, in 1918, the prize offered each year for the
best thesis submitted by a member of the Senior Class. The article is
reproduced without addition or correction.-Eds.
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